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ABSTRACT 
Abstract:  The purpose of this paper is to improve our understanding of the 
relationship between child care price and women's labour supply.  We specify and 
estimate a discrete, structural model of the joint household decision over women's 
labour supply and child care demand.  Parents care about the well-being and 
development of their children and we capture this by including child care directly in 
household utility.  Our model improves on previous papers in that we allow formal 
child care to be used for reasons other than freeing up time for mothers to work (such 
as child development) and we allow mothers’ work hours to exceed formal child care 
hours.  As informal and paternal care are important features of the data, this second 
relaxation of previous hour constraints  is particularly important.  We estimate the 
model using data from 2005 to 2007 from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia (HILDA) Survey.  We find that on average a one percent increase in the net 
price of child care leads to a decrease in hours of labour provided by partnered women 
of 0.10 per cent and a decrease in the employment rate of 0.06 per cent.  These estimates 
are statistically significant.  Furthermore, we find that labour supply responses are 
larger for women with lower wages, less education, and lower income.    
JEL Classification Numbers: C15; C35; J22. 
Keywords:  Child care demand; child care price; women's  labour  supply; 
elasticities; discrete choice model  
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•  In this paper, we specify and estimate a model for partnered women's 
simultaneous decisions about how much to work and how much child 
care to use. 
•  The model is an improvement over previous research in that it allows for 
comparison of alternative policies which affect household budget 
constraints, such as policies which change child care costs, and also allows 
for analysis of the distributional effects of such policies. 
•  The model is realistic in that labour supply and child care decisions are 
treated jointly and both hours worked and hours of child care demanded 
are chosen from a small set of commonly observed values.  Hours can not 
be adjusted in arbitrarily small amounts but must respect the real-life 
constraints of the labour market and slots typically offered by child care 
providers. 
•  The model includes constraints which require that children be cared for at 
all times by someone other than the mother while the mother is working.  
Such constraints are important to avoid bias in the estimated effects of 
child care prices. 
•  The paper improves the modelling of the relationship between hours of 
child care and mothers’ working time in two important ways: 
-  The model allows for the use of child care for purposes other than 
freeing up mothers’ time to work.  For example, child care may be 
used to improve children’s development.   -  The model allows hours worked by the mother to exceed hours of 
formal child care, with the difference being made up by informal 
and/or paternal care.  This relaxation of hours restrictions imposed 
in previous research is important in that we observe in the data that 
over thirty per cent of working mothers work more hours than the 
hours spent by their children in formal care.  
Both of these innovations are novel in the literature. 
•  We  model and include effects of the personal  tax system and major 
transfer  payments including New Start Allowance, Parenting Payment 
Partnered, Family Tax Benefits, and Child Care Benefit.1
•  The model is estimated using data from Waves 5 through 7 (2005 – 2007) 
of the ‘in-confidence’ version of the Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. 
 
•  The model is estimated for partnered women with pre-school children.  
This homogeneous sample reduces model bias from unobserved factors.  
This reduction in bias comes at a cost, however, as the results may not be 
applicable to other groups (partnered women with school-aged children 
or single parents of pre-school children, for example). 
                                              
1 We do not model fringe benefits tax which may be related to child care if it is received as part 
of a compensation package.  We also do not model Child Care Rebate (CCR) which was 
introduced (as the then Child Care Tax Rebate) during our analysis period but which was 
initially paid to families with a long delay.  We argue that CCR did not affect families' 
decisions about child care and in the prices we construct from the data provided by 
families it appears that they did not include CCR in their calculations. •  We focus on the estimation of net price elasticities, which provide an 
estimate of how labour supply or child care demand changes for a change 
in the net price of child care.  The gross price is the posted price at a child 
care centre.  The net price is what families actually pay out of pocket after 
accounting for any subsidies or rebates.  Economic theory tells us that net, 
not gross,  prices should determine  behaviour.  Government policy in 
Australia is targeted at changing the actual out-of-pocket costs that 
families face (rather than, for example, fixing prices) and thus the net price 
elasticity is more appropriate for understanding the effect of policy.  The 
gap between the net and gross price elasticities is not constant across the 
population because of the means testing of subsidies.  Net price elasticities 
are thus more useful to study the distributional effects of policy. 
•  We  confirm the findings of Gong et al. (2010) that the labour supply 
behaviour of partnered women with young children responds (negatively) 
to child care price; 
-  we find that a one per cent increase in the net price of child care for 
pre-school children leads to a decrease in hours worked by 
partnered women of 0.10 per cent.  Such a price change leads to a 
decrease in the employment rate of 0.06 per cent.  These estimates 
are statistically different from zero. 
-  the analogous gross child care price elasticities are similar.  A one 
per cent  increase in the gross pre-school  child care price causes 
mothers' hours of work to decrease by 0.11 per cent and mothers' 
employment rate to decrease by 0.07 per cent.  -  both labour supply and child care demand are more responsive in 
families with lower income, with less educated parents, and with 
lower female wages.  Poorer families, for whom child care expenses 
may take up a larger fraction of  the household budget, are thus 
more affected by child care price changes than wealthier families. 
-  Gong et al. (2010) found a gross child care price elasticity of 
employment of -0.29.  The gross child care price elasticity from the 
approach of Gong et al. (2010)  for the sub-group of pre-school 
children as considered in this paper is -0.15, which is not statistically 
different than the corresponding point estimate of -0.07 presented in 
this paper.   The differences in the two papers can be explained by 
five factors: 
  the two papers estimate different models; 
  the two papers use different methods to calculate elasticities; 
  the two papers use different samples; 
  the price variable which is being changed in the elasticity 
calculation is different in the two papers; and 
  we impose a quantity constraint, in this paper, that total child 
care hours (formal, informal and paternal) be at least as great 
as a mother’s working hours which allows hours of formal 
child care to exceed hours worked by the mother.  There was 
no such constraint imposed in the previous paper. -  The last two points are the most important.  Gong et al. (2010) look at the 
effect on women's labour supply of changing all child care prices whereas 
this paper only looks at changing the price of child care for  pre-school 
children.  Naturally changing more child care prices has a larger effect than 
changing fewer prices so it is not surprising that this paper reports a smaller 
elasticity.  Regarding the quantity constraint, Duncan et al. (2001) showed 
that elasticities may be overestimated if quantity constraints are not taken 
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ESTIMATING NET CHILD CARE PRICE ELASTICITIES OF PARTNERED WOMEN WITH PRE-SCHOOL 
CHILDREN USING A DISCRETE STRUCTURAL LABOUR SUPPLY-CHILD CARE MODEL 
Xiaodong Gong and Robert Breunig 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to increase our understanding of the relationship 
between the price of child care and the labour supply behaviour of partnered 
women.  Many governments, including Australia, subsidise child care to 
encourage female labour force participation  and  also to promote child 
development.  A large part of the effectiveness of these subsidies thus depends 
crucially upon the labour supply responsiveness of women to child care costs.  
In this paper we build a model that can be used to understand and compare the 
labour supply effects of alternative tax and subsidy policies which affect child 
care prices. 
In a previous paper, Gong et al. (2010) showed that there is a negative 
relationship between child care price and partnered women's labour supply.   
They showed that measurement error in child care price is a problem and they 
addressed the problem by constructing local area prices using detailed, child-
level data.  However, they used a linear labour supply model which does not 
correspond to the actual work choices which partnered women face.  They also 
estimate their model in a way that embeds the current tax system and child care 
subsidy policies making the model inappropriate to use for evaluation of 
alternative policies.  In this paper, we use their improved method of price 
construction but address these two limitations through a more realistic labour 
market model combined with an approach which can be used to evaluate 
competing policy proposals. 2 
In this paper we focus on the estimation of the net price elasticity, which 
measures how labour supply or child care demand changes for a change in the 
net price of child care.  Gong et al. (2010) only provided estimates of gross price 
elasticities.  The gross price is the posted price at a child care centre.  The net 
price is what families actually pay out of pocket after accounting for any 
subsidies or rebates.  It is this latter price that economic theory tells us should 
determine behaviour.  Government policy on the cost of child care in Australia is 
targeted at changing the actual out-of-pocket child care costs that families face 
(rather than, for example, fixing prices) and thus the net price elasticity is more 
appropriate for understanding the effect of policy.  It is important to note that 
the gap between the net and gross price elasticities is not constant across the 
population because of the means testing of subsidies.  For some demographic 
groups, net and gross price elasticities may be quite similar whereas for others 
they may be quite different.  Since we also care about the distributional effects of 
policy, this provides another argument for the importance of net price 
elasticities.   
In order to estimate these net price elasticities, we specify and directly estimate 
the household's utility function.   In this respect, our paper is similar to those of 
Blau and Robins (1988); Ribar (1992, 1995); Blau and Hagy (1998); Duncan et al. 
(2001); and Kornstad and Thoresen (2006, 2007).  We construct and estimate a 
joint discrete structural model of labour supply and child care demand for 
partnered women with pre-school children.2
                                              
2 In this paper, partnered women with young children include married women and women in 
de facto relationships. These women are also referred to as `mothers’ and their 
spouses/partners are referred to as `fathers’. 
  We focus on mothers with pre-
school children because they are the group for whom the relationship between 3 
labour supply and child care is strongest.  We assume that women choose work 
hours and hours of formal child care from a small set of realistic values which 
reflect typical work hour patterns and typical time slots which are available 
through child care providers.  The framework may be used to estimate the 
effects of policy changes which affect the household budget constraint, such as 
child care price subsidies, wage subsidies or cash transfers.   
Our paper offers two important methodological innovations.  First, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first paper that explicitly includes child care as an 
argument of the utility function of similar discrete choice models.  Previous 
papers have incorporated child care into such models in very restrictive ways.  
Kalb and Doiron (2005) included child care costs in the budget constraint of a 
standard discrete labour supply model but child care did not enter the utility 
function.  Kornstad and Thoresen (2006, 2007) allowed the possible labour 
supply choices to depend upon mode of child care but restricted  the utility 
function to depend only upon leisure and consumption.  Since parents derive 
utility from the well-being of their children and since child care can be an input 
into children's educational development, it is important to allow child care to 
enter the utility function. 
Second, our modelling of the relationship between hours worked by the mother 
and hours of child care improves upon the previous literature by allowing formal 
child care to be used for reasons other than allowing the mother to work and by 
accounting for the role of informal  and paternal care in freeing up time for 
mothers to work. Children must be cared for at all times.  Duncan et al. (2001) 
showed that it is important to constrain the number of child care hours to be at 
least as large as the hours of labour supplied by the mother.  They showed that 
failure to do so can bias child care price effects.  But Duncan et al. (2001) then 4 
constrained the number of paid (or formal) child care hours to be greater than the 
number of hours worked by the mother, ignoring the possible contribution of 
paternal and informal care.  Kornstad and Thoresen (2006, 2007) also impose an 
hours constraint, specifically that the mother’s work hours must be exactly equal 
to paid child care hours.   In our view, this is too restrictive.  We observe in the 
data (see below) that over thirty per cent of households use less hours of formal 
child care than the number of hours worked by the mothers.  This clearly 
violates the constraints  imposed by Duncan et al. (2001) or Kornstad and 
Thoresen (2006, 2007).   Our model requires that the number of total child care 
hours (formal, informal and paternal) be at least as large as the number of hours 
worked by the mother.  Formal child care hours may be greater or smaller than 
hours worked by the mother.  Thus, our approach improves on both of these 
previous attempts to model quantity constraints.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section (Section 2) we 
discuss the model, the estimation method, and the simulation approach we use 
to estimate elasticities.  Section 3 describes the data.  In Section 4, we present the 
estimation results of the model coefficients and the elasticities simulated from 
those estimates.  This includes discussion of the relationship between the results 
in this paper and earlier results.  Section 5 concludes. 
2.  MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
2.1  The discrete choice model of labour supply and child care 
We estimate a discrete, structural model of the joint decision regarding hours of 
labour supplied by partnered women and household-level child care demand 
for  families  with  pre-school  children.    The model assumes that households 
maximise their utility.  Households get utility from consumption, leisure, and 5 
child development.  Households choose hours of work by the mother, taking 
into account the trade-off between additional consumption which is made 
possible by working more hours but reduced leisure and time with children.  
Hours of formal child care are chosen to maximise child development and to 
free up the mother's time for work, but must be paid for at the market rate.   We 
first discuss two important innovations in our paper:  restricting the set of 
possible hours of work and child care to more realistically reflect labour market 
and child care conditions; and the relationship between hours worked, hours of 
formal care, and hours of paternal and informal care.  We then discuss the 
technical implementation of our model. 
2.1.1  More realistic labour and child care markets 
The theoretical framework  in this paper assumes  that the decision about 
whether or not to work and how many hours to work for partnered women is 
made simultaneously with the decision of whether or not to use child care and 
how much child care to use.  Blau and Robins (1988); Blau and Hagy (1998); and 
Connelly (1992) pioneered this approach, but these early papers assumed that 
hours worked and hours of child care demanded adjusted exactly to families' 
desires.  For example, a partnered woman could choose to work 36 hours and if 
a small change in circumstances made it preferable for her to work 36.5 hours, 
she could adjust her labour supply exactly.   
Our model is based on the standard discrete neo-classic labour supply model 
first developed by Van Soest (1995), but extended to include maternal child care 
as an explicit argument of the household utility function and to define the 
budget constraint over a small, discrete set of possible working hours and 
formal child care hours rather than over working hours alone.  For example, an 
individual may choose to work 35 or 40 hours, but not a value in between these 6 
two points.  (In practice, as described below,  we allow eight different 
possibilities for working hours  and six different possibilities for formal child 
care hours.)  Families pick the combination of mother's  working hours and 
formal child care that maximises their well-being from this set of 48 possible 
combinations of hours worked and hours of child care demanded.  Kornstad 
and Thoresen (2007) estimate a similar model in that households are constrained 
in their choice of work and child care hours to a discrete set of points.  However, 
our paper differs in the treatment of the relationship between formal child care 
and hours worked by the mother, as described below.   
2.1.2  Formal child care, informal child care paternal care and mother's working hours 
In our model, we assume the following: 
(1)  During waking hours, children are cared for in one of four possible ways:  
by the mother; by the father; in a paid, formal child care setting; or in an 
informal child care setting.  This last category will include care by other 
relatives or friends and may be paid or unpaid. 
(2)  In our model, we combine the  father’s time caring for children with 
informal care.  This is partially driven by data restrictions.  We do not 
observe hours or price of informal care.  Nor do we observe hours of care 
by the father.  In our model of the time allocation for mothers and 
children, therefore, these two types of care appear interchangeable.  The 
model does allow for fathers to spend time taking care of children and 
allows the amount of time which fathers spend taking care of children to 
vary across households, but this care is not explicitly modelled.   
(3)  We assume that fathers’ hours worked do not respond to changes in the 
price of formal child care  or to mothers’ wages.  This is assumed for 7 
tractability of the model but also corresponds to evidence that mothers 
still bear a disproportionate share of time in taking care of children 
(Sayer, 2005; Kalenkoski  et al., 2005).  Kalenkoski  et al.  (2005)  also 
confirmed a common finding that while women's market work responds 
to the presence of children, men's market work does not.  Kimmel and 
Connelly (2007) modelled women's time spent in a variety of activities 
including home production and childcare and similarly treated fathers’ 
behaviour as fixed.  
(4)  The household may choose to use formal child care regardless of whether 
the mother is at work or not.  Formal care may exceed mother's working 
hours  and may be used for purposes such as child development or 
freeing up time for the mother for activities other than paid work.   
(5)  We impose the restriction that total child care hours are at least as great 
as the hours of paid work by the mother and model informal and 
paternal child care as the difference between mother's working hours and 
formal child care hours.  If formal child care hours equal or exceed 
mother's working hours, we assume that informal and paternal child care 
are zero.  Otherwise, we set combined paternal and informal child care 
equal to mother's hours worked less hours in formal child care.3
                                              
3  An alternative approach would be to use reported hours of informal care and to 
simultaneously model demand for formal and informal care alongside mother's labour 
supply.  One immediate problem is that there is no information on price for informal care 
(in our data, only 10 per cent report paying for informal child care) even though families 
may incur non-pecuniary costs.   
   
Families will face different costs and benefits of informal care depending 
upon the proximity of grandparents or other relatives or the presence of 8 
other potential care-takers at home and we account for this in the model.  
Our approach is an improvement over Duncan et al. (2001) and Kornstad 
and Thoresen (2007) who assume, unrealistically, that formal child care 
hours must be greater than or equal to mother's hours of work.  In our 
data, see below, about one-third of households report formal child care 
exceeding mother's working hours. 
Figure 1 presents the household’s decision over the allocation of the child's time.  
Sleep (the darkest shaded area) is treated as fixed and the family decides over 
the allocation of the green parts--how to split the remaining time into care by the 
mother, formal child care and informal/paternal child care.  
Figure 2 presents the mother's time allocation.  After sleeping time, which is 
treated as fixed, mother's remaining time (the three most lightly shaded sections 
of  Figure 2) is allocated between working, taking care of children, and leisure.  
Two `adding-up' constraints implied from (1) - (4) above must hold: 
•  Mother's time taking care of child = child's time being taken care of by 
mother 
•  Child's time in informal/paternal care = mother's working hours - child's 
time in formal care (or zero if this is negative) 9 
 
 
We  further assume that, for mothers with both pre-school  and  school–aged 
children, the primary consideration of the mother when she makes her labour 
supply and child care usage  decisions  is the well-being of the pre-school 
child(ren).    That is, we assume that when school-aged children are  present 
together with pre-school children in the same  household, child care of the 
school-aged children outside school hours is assumed to mirror that of the pre-
school children.  Again, this is for tractability.  For example, if formal hours of 
child care for the pre-school child are 40 and the school-age child is in school 30 
hours per week then we assume that the school-age child is in before- and/or 
Figure 1:  Child's Time 
Sleep 
Cared for by Mother 
Formal child care 
Informal/paternal child 
care 
Figure 2: Mother's time 
Sleep 
Leisure 
Caring for children 
Working 10 
after-school care for 10 (40 less 30) hours per week.  We test this assumption in 
two ways.  First, we replace this assumption with an assumption that formal 
child care of school-aged children is fixed and does not enter the utility function.  
Secondly, we estimate the model using households with pre-school  children 
only. We present these results in the Appendix and discuss them in section 4.2.3.  
None of the conclusions of the paper are sensitive to this assumption.   
2.1.3  Technical specification of the model 
The household is assumed to maximise a trans-log utility function by choosing 
consumption  y mother’s working hours  h and formal child care hours  fi c  of 
each of her K children (indexed by i) from a set of discrete options: 
1 ,, , ,   ( ) ' ' ,     (log ,log ,log )'
f fK
mm yhc c M a xU vv A v b vv y l c = +≡
             (1)  
0
1




y y wh X pc X τϕ
=
≤+ − ∑                                        (2) 
y  is general consumption net of child care costs which is determined through 
the budget constraint (2) by asset income and father’s income (both captured in 
0 y ), the mother’s wage (w) and working hours, and the tax and transfer  system 
which is captured by the function τ   and which depends upon household 
characteristics,  X .4 ϕ   The function   captures child care subsidies which depend 
upon child care costs (price, which may vary by the age of the child,  i p  
multiplied by usage) and household characteristics.  In addition to requiring that 
formal care of school-aged children be determined by the care needs of the pre-
                                              
4 Inτ , we include Newstart Allowance (NSA), Parenting Payment Partnered (PPP), Family Tax 
Benefits A and B, together with personal income tax, Medicare levy, and Low Income Tax 
Offset (LITO).  Tables 2 and 3 list the variables that are contained in X.  11 
school children as described in 2.1.2 above, we also assume that all pre-school 
children use the same amount of formal care and pay the same price.  This can 
be alternatively viewed as allowing differences in hours and price of care for 
pre-school children, but modelling the family's average demand. 
m l  is the leisure of the mother which is specified as the difference between her 
time endowment ( m T ) and time spent either working or caring for children as in 
Figure 2 above 
       , mm m l T hc = −−                                                                                                            (3) 
m c is the time spent on maternal care which is specified as  
      min{ , }, m c cf c T hT c = −−                                                                                               (4) 
where  c T  is the time during which children need to be cared for either by the 
mother, by the father, through the formal market or informally.   c T  represents 
the three most lightly shaded sections of  Figure 1. 
The parameters of the utility function are summarised in  A, a symmetric 33 ×
parameter matrix with entries  ij A , ( , 1, 2,3 ij = ), and  123 ( , , )' b bbb = , a vector with 
three parameters.  1 b   is a constant, but  2 b   and  3 b   are specified to allow both 
observed and unobserved individual and household characteristics to  affect  
utility: 
  𝑏𝑘 = ∑ 𝗽𝑘𝑠𝑥𝑠
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑝𝑘 𝑆𝑘
𝑠=1 , (k=2,3)                 (5) 
where 𝑥𝑠
𝑘 are exogenous characteristics including the age of the mother and the 
children, number of children in each age group, and other characteristics that 
describe the family composition such as the presence of extra female adults. In 12 
the case of multiple children, maternal child care is measured as the average 
number of maternal care hours for all pre-school children in the household and 
the impact of the number of children on utility is through  3 b . That is, the number 
of children affects the marginal utility of maternal care by shifting  3 b .  (This 
explains why  23 bb ≠   in equation (5) above.  The k subscript on S  allows for 
different characteristics to enter the two equations.)  Moreover, the potential 
impact of informal child care is also allowed for by the inclusion of a dummy in 
3 b  equal to one if  f hc > . This dummy controls for which condition in equation 
(4) determines maternal child care hours and equals one if the family makes 
recourse to informal child care (as calculated by our residual measure of 
informal child care usage).  The error terms 
k p ε  may be interpreted as random 
preferences due to unobserved characteristics. 
Working hours and formal child care hours may take the following values:  
{0,8,16,24,32,40,48,56} h∈ ,                     (6) 
and 
{0,10,20,30,40,50}, fi c ∈                                                                                                  (7) 
These can be chosen in any of the possible 48 combinations, allowing a wide 
range of part-time and half-day possibilities for both work and formal care.   
To estimate the model, we add random disturbances  j µ  (as in Van Soest, 1995) 
to each alternative in the choice set, as in the multinomial logit model (Maddala, 
1983): 
( , , )  ( 0,...,48) j j j mj mj j U Uyl c j µ = +=                                                                               (8) 13 
where  j µ ’s are independently and identically distributed with a type I extreme 
value distribution, and are independent of all observable and unoberservable 
terms in the model. 
The mother chooses alternative  j if it is the alternative (out of m*g=48) from 
which she derives the most utility, i.e.  if  j U   is the largest among all the 
alternatives. Conditional upon 
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                                                                        (9) 
To predict the wage rates of non-workers and workers whose wages are missing 
in the data and to allow for correlation between wage rates and unobserved 
utility preferences (
k p ε ), a wage equation is simultaneously estimated with (1) 
and specified as a standard Mincer wage equation: 
log '
w wz πε = +                                                                                                                (10) 
where  z  is a vector of individual characteristics of the mother.  Her education 
level, current area of residence measured by capital city and state, and a variable 
equal to one if the mother lived with both of her parents when she was 14 (to 
capture stability while growing up) are included in the wage equation but not in 
the utility function and serve the role of exclusion restrictions.  π  is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated. 
w ε  is an unobserved term, assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean zero, independent of  z , but is allowed to be correlated 
with 
k p ε .  
As in similar models (for example, Gong and Van Soest, 2002), unobserved fixed 
benefit of not working (FB) is added to the income at zero hours of work. Thus 14 
the utility of all alternatives at zero hours of work are replaced by 
0 0, ( ,) mm U y FB l c + . FB is specified as 
' FB t δ =                                                                                                                          (11) 
where t is a vector of exogenous variables (which are listed in Table 2) and δ  is 
a vector of parameters. Positive fixed benefits increase the  probability of not 
working by increasing the utility of non-participation.  They can be interpreted 
equally as fixed costs associated with working. 
2.2  Estimation 
If all the wages were observed and there were no unobserved preferences, the 
model could be estimated by maximum likelihood  with the likelihood 
contribution given by Equation (9). With unobserved wages, the wage Equation 
(10) also needs to be estimated. This is done simultaneously with the joint labour 
supply-child care model. With the presence of unobserved preferences in leisure 
and maternal child care, maximum likelihood estimation would require 
evaluation of the three-dimensional integral defined over the distribution of the 
error terms 
w ε , 
2 p ε , and 
3 p ε . Numerical integration in more than two dimensions 
can be difficult to solve.    
We use Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) to avoid this multi-dimensional 
numerical integration.  Denoting the probability of working  j h  hours and using 
j c hours of formal child care conditional on 
2 p ε , 
3 p ε , and wage rate5
3 2 Pr , | , ,  ( 1,...,48),
p p
jf j h hc c w j εε  = = = 
 by 
                                                                     (12) 
                                              
5 Throughout, we condition on earnings of the husband, other non-labour income, child care 
price, and other exogenous explanatory variables. These are suppressed in our notation. 15 
The exact likelihood contribution for someone observed to work  0 h  and use  0 c  
hours of formal child care with observed gross wage rate  0 w  is then given by 
3 33 22 2
0 0 0 1 02 0 0 Pr[ , | , , ] ( | ) ( | )d d ( ),
p pp pp p
f L h hc c w f w f w fw εε ε ε εε = = = ∫∫                           (13) 
Or, if the wage rate is not observed, the exact likelihood contribution is 
33 3 22 2
00 1 2 P r [ , |, , ]( |)( |)() d d d ,
pp p pp p
f L h hc c w f wf wfw w εε ε ε εε = = = ∫∫∫                          (14) 
where  ( | ) (k=1,2) k fw ⋅  are the conditional density functions of 
k p ε given  w, and 
(w) f  is the density of the wage rate (or of 
w ε ). The three error terms 
w ε , 
2 p ε , and 
3 p ε are specified to follow a joint normal distribution of which the parameters are 












�                         (15)             
The numerical multi-dimensional integral is approximated by a simulated mean: 
for each individual, we take  R draws from the distribution of the error terms       
(
w ε , 
2 p ε , and 
3 p ε ) and compute the average of the R  likelihood values 
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 = = =  ∑  
where  log '
w
rr wz πε = +  and (
w
r ε , 
2 p
r ε , 
3 p
r ε )  ( 1,..., ) rR =  are based upon draws from 
the distribution of (
w ε , 
2 p ε , 
3 p ε ).  16 
The draws are taken from Halton sequences using the procedure described in 
Train (2003).   The  estimator  resulting from random independent  draws  is 
inconsistent for fixed R, but will be consistent as  R tends to infinity with the 
number of observations of the sample.6
2.3  Simulations and the calculation of the net price elasticity 
  Many studies (see e.g., Morokoff and 
Caflisch, 1995, Sloan and Wozniakowski, 1998, Bhat, 2001, Train, 2003, Sandor 
and Train, 2004) show that using ‘quasi-random’ draws which are designed to 
provide better coverage than independent draws, simulation can be  more 
efficient in terms of reduced simulation errors for a given number of draws. In 
particular, Bhat (2001), Train  (2003), and Sandor and Train (2004) all tested 
Halton sequences for mixed logit models and found their use to be superior to 
random, independent draws.  
Labour supply and child care demand behaviour of households may be 
described by their corresponding elasticities.  Due to the complexity of the 
model, simulation is needed to derive elasticities and to estimate policy effects.  
When calculating the elasticities, hours of work and child care are calculated as 
`expected hours’, that is computed as a probability weighted sum of hours over 
all possible values which hours can take.    Wage, gross child care price, and 
income elasticities for each observation are derived by increasing all wage rates, 
gross child care price, or other incomes by 1 per cent  and calculating the 
percentage change of average expected hours or average expected employment 
rate.  The net child care price elasticity is calculated as the ratio between the 
gross price elasticity and the percentage change in the net child care price 
                                              
6  If  /0 nR →   and with independent drawings across observations, the method is 
asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood (see Lee, 1992, or Gourieroux and 
Monfort, 1993 for references). 17 
corresponding to a 1 per cent change in the gross child care price.  From these, 
we calculate the average elasticities for the whole sample and for selected 
subsamples  of interest. The standard errors of these average elasticities are 
obtained using Monte Carlo methods by repeating the simulation 100 times with 
parameter estimates of the model drawn from their estimated distributions.  
3.  DATA 
3.1  Data source and sample 
Data are drawn from waves five, six, and seven of the `in-confidence' version of 
the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)  Survey 
which cover the period 2005 -  2007.  The HILDA Survey is an annual panel 
survey of Australian households which  was begun in 2001.7
Firstly, and most importantly, the HILDA survey data from wave five onwards 
collected child care usage data separately by child.  It also collected data on 
hours of child care used to support paid employment and hours of child care 
used for other reasons such as freeing up time for mothers or for educational 
reasons.  In the first four waves, data was more aggregated within the 
household. 
    There are 
approximately 7,000 households and 13,000 individuals who respond in each 
wave.  The choice of data is based upon four considerations.   
 Secondly, we choose to pool across three waves of data to achieve a sufficiently 
large sample size.  This is important in the construction of our local average 
child care price, described in detail in section 3.2 below. 
                                              
7 See Watson and Wooden (2002) for more details. 18 
Thirdly, child care policies in Australia were roughly constant over this period.  
In particular, there were no major changes to the Child Care Benefit scheme 
during this period.  The Child Care Tax Rebate (CCTR), now called Child Care 
Rebate, was announced at the beginning of the sample period.  However, the 
way in which the rebate was originally structured through the tax system meant 
that families only received the payment if they paid tax and they did not receive 
the rebate, in the form of a lump sum payment, until two years after making the 
expense.   From 1 July, 2007, this two year gap was reduced to one year and the 
rebate also became available to non-taxpayers.  However, the benefit was only 
paid after tax returns were lodged which maintained an important time lag 
between incurring the expense and receiving the payment.  Given this time lag 
and the lump-sum nature of the payment, we assume that this program did not 
affect people's decisions during our sample period.  Furthermore, as noted 
below in section 3.2, our child care prices are constructed assuming that survey 
respondents did not factor in the Child Care Rebate when reporting the net 
prices they pay for child care.  Our constructed prices match the administrative 
data.  If we assume that people are factoring in Child Care Rebate, the match 
with administrative data is worse.  A final consideration which favours this 
choice of sample period is that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2010) created 
a  gross  child care price index  from 2005, which we use to make the price 
comparable across waves.8
                                              
8 For an explanation of the difference between the gross and net child care price indexes, see 
"Child Care Time Series Table" in "Appendix Child Care Services in the CPI.  Treatment 
of Child Care Services in the Australian Consumer Price Index (CPI)" in Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2010.  Available on-line at http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/ 
abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/6401.0Appendix1Sep%202010?opendocument&tabname=Not
es&prodno=6401.0&issue=Sep%202010&num=&view=.  (Last viewed 20 July 2011.) 
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We focus on the labour supply of partnered mothers with at least one pre-school 
child and the demand for formal child care in these households.  In waves 5 
through 7 of the HILDA survey there are 20,342 observations on 7,741 women.  
Once we remove women from the sample who are neither married nor in 
defacto relationships, there are 12,109 observations on 4,754 women.  Excluding 
those families with no pre-school children further reduces the sample to 2,601 
observations on 1,198 women.  We exclude  a further 131 observations on 92 
women who live in multiple-family households  and 219 observations on 156 
women who are studying full-time.  This leaves us with an estimation sample of 
2,251 observations on 1,069 women across the three waves.  After discarding 
observations with missing values for any variables used in our model (excepting 
wage), the sample consists of 2,023 observations on 978 partnered mothers with 
at least one pre-school child.  
Note that households with school-aged children, but without pre-school 
children, are omitted from our analysis sample.  Our rationale for this is that the 
labour supply and child care issues faced by those households may be quite 
different from those with pre-school  children.    Importantly, school-aged 
children attend school for around 30 hours per week, which makes their need 
for maternal or non-maternal child care much less than that of younger children.  
This sample of households with pre-school children, for these reasons, will be a 
more homogeneous sample which should reduce the influence of unobserved 
preferences on observed outcomes.  This sample homogeneity allows for a 
simpler model and provides a reduction in bias. 
We present sample statistics in the second column of Table 1. In the third 
column of Table 1 we present the sample statistics for a sub-sample of 1,159 
mothers of pre-school children in households in which there are no school-aged 20 
children present.  This sub-sample is used for sensitivity analysis as described 
below.  From the second column of Table 1, about 43 per cent of households 
with pre-school children use formal child care.  Hours spent in child care for the 
pre-school  children are about  18 hours  per week.  About 56 per cent of the 
mothers were employed and the average working mother works 25 hours per 
week at an hourly wage of $25 (at the June 2005 price level). The characteristics 
of  the mothers in the sub-sample are  broadly similar to those  of the whole 
sample except they are younger and slightly better educated. 
Many households use less formal child care than the mother’s hours of work. To 
see how mothers’ working hours and formal child care hours are related, Figure  
3 presents the distribution of the difference between the two. Figure 3 shows 
that in about more than thirty per cent of households with pre-school children, 
the average reported hours of formal child care per pre-school child are less than 
the mothers’ reported hours of work.  This indicates that the quantity constraint 
(that formal child care hours are greater than or equal to hours worked by the 
mother) imposed by Duncan et al. (2001) and Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) is 
probably too restrictive. 
Table 1. Sample statistics:  mean values.  Pooled data from 2005 - 2007 
Variables  Partnered mothers with at 
least one pre-school child 
Partnered mothers with pre-
school children but with no 
school-aged children 
Hours worked per week (for those mothers who 
are working)  
24.8 (13.7)  25.6 (13.5) 
Employment rate (mothers)  0.56  0.60 
Average hours of formal child care (per child) for 
children using formal care 
18.8 (12.9)  19.0 (13.2) 
Proportion of families using formal care  0.43  0.45 
Hourly wage rate of the mother (at June 2005 
price) 
25.3 (22.5)  26.6 (22.1) 
Weekly household income from father's earnings 
and unearned private income  
1238 (1242)  1305 (1289) 
Median hourly child care price (at June 2005 
price) 
4.67 (0.92)  4.73 (0.98) 
Age of the mother  32.9 (5.9)  31.8 (5.8) 
Dummy variables for highest level of education received:   
Mother received higher education              0.34  0.41 
Mother received vocational education           0.25  0.24 21 
Note: Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
Mother finished Year 12 only       0.21  0.21 
Mother did not finish Year 12                    0.21  0.14 
Father received higher education        0.27  0.30 
Father received vocational education         0.42  0.40 
Father finished Year 12 only                    0.14  0.16 
Father did not finish Year 12                    0.17  0.14 
Dummy, mother did not live with both parents at 
the age of 14 
0.22  0.22 
Dummy, equals one if the mother was not born in 
Australia, but was educated in Australia 
0.14  0.15 
Dummy, equals one if the mother was educated 
and born outside of Australia 
0.05  0.06 
Dummy, the mother speaks a language other than 
English 
0.12  0.11 
Dummy, the mother is Aboriginal or and Torres 
Strait Islander 
0.02  0.02 
Dummy, equals one if mother and the father both 
educated in Australia and both born outside of 
Australia. 
0.19  0.20 
Dummy, equals one the mother and the father are 
both born and educated outside of Australia 
0.10  0.08 
Number of children aged 0 to 4  1.3 (0.6)  1.4 (0.6) 
Number of children aged 5 to 12  .60 (0.8)  - 
Number of children aged 13 to 15  .09 (0.3)  0.05 (0.25) 
Age of the youngest child  1.5(1.5)  1.1 (1.2) 
Dummy, presence of female adult in the 
household other than the mother 
0.03  0.03 
Dummy, presence of children older than 12 in the 
household 
0.87  0.78 
Mean age of children   1.9 (1.4)  1.5 (1.2) 
Dummy variables equal to one if current state of residence is:   
NSW  0.28  0.27 
VIC  0.25  0.26 
QLD  0.23  0.24 
SA  0.08  0.07 
WA  0.10  0.11 
TAS  0.03  0.02 
NT  0.01  0.01 
ACT  0.03  0.03 
% of child care staff with teaching experience 
(state average)        
15.7% (4.4%)  15.7% (4.4%) 
% of child care staff with teaching qualification 
(state average)    
66.9% (5.0%)  66.9% (5.0%) 
Observations (number of partnered mothers)  2,023  1,159 22 
Figure 3. Hours worked by mothers less average formal child care hours of  pre-school 
children 
 
3.2  Child care price 
Gong et al. (2010) show that measurement error in the child care price can have 
large effects on results in labour supply and child care demand models.  In this 
paper, we follow their method to construct the child care price.  The model is 
designed to evaluate how families respond to changes in child care price in 
terms of their demand for child care and mothers' labour supply.  We thus need 
a price that reflects a `typical' amount that a household will have to pay if they 
choose to increase hours of formal child care (or an amount they will save if they 
decrease formal hours of child care.)   
There are two problems that arise.  The first is that we need a child care price 



















Hours worked by mother less average hours of formal child care of preschool children23 
changes, these families may begin to use child care and we need a price to 
evaluate this possibility. 
When families purchase child care they are purchasing a bundle of attributes.  
They are paying the cost of having their children cared for at some basic 
standard.  But they are also paying, perhaps at additional cost, for other 
attributes such as quality and location.  This quality component which makes up 
part of the observed price that is being paid by families who already use child 
care creates a modelling problem.  The family’s choice of how much quality to 
purchase (i.e. the choice of what child care price to pay) is likely to be correlated 
with unobservable components in the utility function and in the labour supply 
equation.  This correlation between actual price paid and unobservable effects 
creates bias in estimated coefficients and elasticities.   
To solve both of these problems, we calculate a local average (median9) price for 
each Labour Force Survey Region (LFSR)10
The `in-confidence' version of HILDA allows us to implement this solution as it 
contains information on the postcode in which respondents live.  This version of 
HILDA also provides child care usage by age groupings of children, gross 
family income, child and family characteristics, and eligibility rules for Child 
 in Australia.  We apply this price to 
families that do not currently use child care and to families that currently use 
child care.  In this way, the component that is specific to families’ current choice 
of child care is at least partly ‘averaged out’.   
                                              
9 We use the median since it is less vulnerable to outliers than the mean. 
10 Labour Force Survey Regions are described in ABS, 2005. 24 
Care Benefit.  We construct separate  prices  for  pre-school  and school-aged 
children.   
In the HILDA survey, we have the number of hours  kht h spent in child care for 
each child (k) in the household (h) for each of three types of child care (t)--long 
day care, family day care, and other formal paid care.11
sht c 
  Households in the data 
report hours of child care used.  We calculate hours paid by rounding up to 
multiples of five hours for not-yet-in-school-aged children and multiples of three 
hours for school-aged children to reflect typical lengths of paid sessions.  Long 
day care centres and family day care centres typically operate 50 hours per 
week, and typical part-time arrangements are at least in units of half-days. For 
school-aged children, typical after-school care sessions are 3 hours.  Net cost of 
child care   is not provided for each child but is provided for each type of care 
and is split by school-aged (s=1) and not-yet-in-school (s=0) aged children.  For 
families who have one child in the not-yet-in-school-aged category, we know the 
cost of child care for each type of care for that child.  For families that have more 
than one child in the not-yet-in-school-aged category, we only know the total 
amount spent on that group of children for each type of care. 
Since we know the hours that each child is in care for each type of care, we split 
the cost in proportion to the hours spent in that type of care.  We assume that 
families are spending the same amount per hour on each child within the same 












                          (16) 
                                              
11 This last category is mostly in-home care at the home of the carer or the home of the child. 25 
We combine this with the hours of child care information to calculate a gross 
per-child price for each type of care. 
We take all of these individual child prices and calculate two median prices for 
each Labour Force Survey Region (LFSR):  one for children who are not yet in 
school and one for school-aged children.  We impute this median price to each 
household in the LFSR.  For pre-school children, we have sixteen observations 
per LFSR on average.  There is substantial variation across LFSRs.  Table 5 in 
Gong et al, 2010 shows that this method of constructing prices does well in 
matching state-level average prices from administrative data. 
By using local area averages, we are essentially using a quality-adjusted price.  
Our modelling assumption is that households react to the average price level 
irrespective of the quality they choose.  This is akin to assuming that shifts in 
median prices affect all quality levels.  We control for child care quality by 
adding variables from administrative data which capture the average number of 
qualified staff per child in formal day care centres.  These variables are only 
available at the state level however. 
Finally, we note that the main variable of interest in this study is the price of 
child care for children who are not yet in school.  We calculate the price for 
school-aged children and this price enters into the family budget constraint (and 
thus it affects the decision to work), but we do not analyse how changes in this 
price affect behaviour.  We focus on how mothers’ behaviour changes as the 
price for pre-school children changes. 26 
4.  RESULTS 
4.1  Estimation results 
The Simulated Maximum Likelihood results are based upon 30 draws per 
household.  We present the parameter estimates of the utility function in Table 2.  
The parameters  ij A  and  i b  determine the shape of the utility function but their 
interpretation is not straightforward.  The signs of the parameters in  b 
determine the direction in which characteristics affect preferences. A positive  2k β  
implies a positive effect of  k x  on the marginal utility of leisure. However, unlike 
in a standard discrete labour supply model where leisure is specified as the 
residual of labour supply from the mother’s  total endowment, it  cannot be 
interpreted readily as a negative effect on labour supply in this model. In this 
model, leisure is the residual of labour supply and maternal care  so that a 
positive effect on leisure can be a negative effect on either labour supply or 
maternal care, or both. Similarly, a positive  3k β implies a positive effect of  k x  on 
maternal care but may represent either a negative effect on labour supply or a 
negative effect on formal child care, or both.  
Table 2. Simulated maximum likelihood estimates - parameters of the utility function 
Partnered mothers with at least one pre-school child, pooled estimates (2005-2007) 
Variables     
2
11  () yA   -0.158[-1.34]   
2
22  () lA  -1.472**[-4.53] 
2
m 33 c ( ) A    0.273**[2.96]  
12  () yl A   -0.016[-0.16]   
13  () m yc A   -0.005[-0.06]   
23  () m lc A   -0.542**[-5.28] 
1 b   5.079**[6.31] 
' bs   2 b   3 b  
Constant   -0.854[-0.66]      2.952[1.55]    
Age of the mother         0.333**[2.20]     0.397**[2.90]  
The mother speaks a language other than English  -0.925**[-2.67]    0.004[0.02]    
The mother is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander  -1.365[-1.33]      1.372[1.29]    
The mother was educated in Australia but was not born in Australia   0.025[0.08]      
The mother was educated and born outside of Australia  -0.012[-0.03]     
Age of the youngest child   0.406**[5.62]     0.048[0.25]    27 
No. of children aged 0 to 4   0.857**[5.08]     0.331[1.44]    
No. of children aged 5 to 12  -0.184*[-1.76]     0.078[0.91]    
No. of children aged 13 to 15   0.248[1.17]      -0.646**[-2.80] 
Presence of female adult (besides mother) in household  0.135[0.31]    0.468[1.05 ]   
Dummy variables for highest level of education received:     
Father received higher education               -0.219[-0.78]  -0.154[-0.68] 
Father received vocational education           -0.038[-0.15]   0.027[0.13 ] 
Father did not finish Year 12                    -0.176[-0.60]  -0.126[-0.51] 
Father has Year 12 education     
The mother and the father were both educated in Australia but neither 
was born in Australia 
  -0.006[-0.04] 
Mother and father were both born and educated outside of  Australia    -0.458**[-2.00] 
Presence of children older than 12 in household     0.172[1.45 ]   
Mean age of pre-school children                     -0.180[-0.92]   
% of child care staff with teaching experience (state average)           -0.039**[-1.96] 
% of child care staff with teaching qualification (state average)       -0.009[-0.39]   
Variance of the unobserved preference for leisure ( 2
p σ )  0.014[0.05]  0.160**[3.62] 
Covariance  of unobserved preference for leisure and unobserved 
heterogeneity in wage (
wp σ ) 
0.038 [0.93]  0.149**[6.05] 
t-values are in the brackets. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level.  
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Table 2 (continued) 
Simulated maximum likelihood estimates - parameters of the utility function 
Partnered mothers with at least one pre-school child, pooled estimates (2005-2007) 
Fixed benefit equation 
Constant    1.168**[7.25]  
Age of the mother        -0.207**[-5.17] 
The mother speaks a language other than English   0.230**[2.95]  
The mother is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander  -0.075[-0.44]   
The mother was educated in Australia but was not born in Australia   0.051[0.84]    
The mother was educated and born outside of Australia   0.148*[1.79]   
Age of the youngest child  -0.081**[-4.79] 
No. of children aged 0 to 4   0.017[0.46]    
No. of children aged 5 to 12   0.101**[3.48]  
No. of children aged 13 to 15   0.280**[3.72]  
Presence of female adult (besides mother) in household   0.003[0.03 ]   
Dummy variables for highest level of education received:   
Father received higher education               -0.010[-0.16] 
Father received vocational education           -0.043[-0.73] 
Father did not finish year 12                     0.076[1.09 ] 
Father has Year 12 education   
Dummy, wave 6 (2006)   0.026[0.72 ] 
Dummy, wave 7 (2007)   0.058[1.56 ] 
Likelihood  -3347.96 
Observations  2,023 
t-values are in the brackets. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level.  
 
From the estimates, we see that family structure and the mother’s characteristics 
all play important roles in determining preferences.  The number of children, 
age of the mother, and the mother’s immigration background (as indicated by 
speaking  a language other than English) all have significant effects on 
preferences.    However, the direction and magnitude of the impacts of the 
variables on labour supply or maternal care can not be ascertained directly from 
the parameter values, but rather need to be calculated through simulation. 
The parameters in the fixed benefit equation can be linked more directly to the 
labour force participation of the mother—a positive parameter indicates that the 
corresponding variable increases the benefits of not working and thus a negative 
impact on participation.  For example, the older the youngest child is, the lower 
the fixed benefit of not working.  Mothers with older children are therefore more 
likely to participate in the labour force than those with younger children.  The 29 
number of school-aged children also plays a significant role in this fixed benefit -
-more young children (including school-aged) leads to a higher fixed benefit of 
staying at home and a lower participation rate. 
It is worth noting that unobserved preferences for maternal care play a 
significant role and they are positively  correlated with the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the wage equation. The variance of the unobserved preference 
for leisure, however, is imprecisely estimated.  
Table 3. Simulated maximum likelihood estimates –wage equation 
Partnered mothers with at least one pre-school child, pooled estimates (2005-2007) 
Variables   
Constant     1.994**[7.53 ] 
Age of the mother          0.476**[3.02 ] 
Age-squared  of the mother         -0.049**[-2.07] 
Dummy variables for highest level of education received:   
Mother received higher education                 0.445**[14.91] 
Mother received vocational education             0.118**[3.82 ] 
Mother did not finish year 12                     -0.091**[-2.57] 
Mother has Year 12 education   
The mother speaks a language other than English   -0.097**[-2.46] 
The mother is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander   -0.016[-0.11]   
The mother did not live with both parents at the age of 14   -0.026[-0.97]   
Sydney   
Balance of NSW   -0.136**[-3.65] 
Melbourne                -0.137**[-4.29] 
Balance of VIC     -0.113**[-2.65] 
Brisbane           -0.123**[-3.29] 
Balance of QLD     -0.122**[-3.21] 
Adelaide            -0.048[-0.89]   
Balance of SA      -0.254**[-2.87] 
Perth              -0.171**[-3.49] 
Balance of WA     -0.203**[-3.38] 
Tasmania               -0.224**[-2.33] 
Northern Territory   -0.095[-0.50]   
ACT               -0.068[-1.30]   
The mother was educated in Australia but was not born in Australia   -0.040[-1.34]   
The mother was educated and born outside of Australia   -0.147**[-3.04] 
Variance of the unobservables in the wage equation (
2
w σ )  0.151**[63.62] 
t-values are in the brackets. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. 
 
The parameter estimates for the wage equation are presented in Table 3. The 
parameter estimates are in line with a standard Mincer equation for Australia 30 
(see Breusch and Gray, 2004; Leigh, 2008; and Breunig et al., 2008 for a few 
examples). For example, higher education brings a wage premium of about 45 
per cent for mothers of pre-school children, relative to their counterparts who 
only finished Year 12, and women who speak a language other than English 
earn less than those who do not. 
4.2  Simulation results 
Table 4 presents average elasticities of labour supply and child care demand 
with respect to mother's wage, other combined family income (partner's labour 
income and household non-labour income), gross child care price and net child 
care price for the full sample.  
Labour supply and child care both have two components:  the decision to 
participate and the decision of how much to participate.  For the labour supply 
elasticities we report an employment (or participation) elasticity that addresses 
the question of whether or not people choose to work.  The hours elasticity 
captures both changing hours for those who are already working and changing 
hours for those who decide to commence or cease working. 
Similarly with child care, we provide an elasticity (use of formal care) which 
captures the decision to use child care or not.  The hours elasticity captures both 
changing hours for those who are already using child care and changing hours 
for those who decide to commence or cease using child care. 
Table 4. Elasticities:  All partnered mothers with at least one pre-school child 
With respect to  Labour supply elasticity  Child care demand elasticity 
Hours  Employment  Hours of formal care  Use of formal care 
Gross child care price  -0.106** (0.03)  -0.070** (0.02)  -0.294** (0.05)  -0.166** (0.03) 
Net child care price  -0.096** (0.03)  -0.059** (0.01)  -0.246** (0.04)  -0.132** (0.02) 
Wage  0.427** (0.08)  0.274** (0.05)  0.281** (0.06)  0.176** (0.03) 
Household  Income  (other 
than mother's earnings) 
-0.092* (0.05)  -0.048 (0.04)  -0.036 (0.04)  -0.036* (0.02) 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. ** Significant at 5 % level. * Significant at 10% level. 
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4.2.1  Labour supply elasticities 
First of all, it is worth noting that the estimates of wage and income elasticities of 
labour supply in Table 4 are in line with the literature (see for example, Breunig, 
et al., 2008 or Gong et al., 2010 which surveyed the estimates). For mothers with 
pre-school children, the average wage elasticities of hours worked and 
employment are 0.427 and 0.274 (significant at the 5 per cent level) and the 
income elasticities of hours worked and employment are -0.092 (significant at 
the 10 per cent level) and -0.048.  
Secondly, the average labour supply elasticities of both gross and net child care 
price are statistically significant and negative.  The average gross child care price 
elasticities of hours of work and employment for the mothers are -0.106 and 
-0.070, respectively, which means that for a one per cent increase in the gross 
child care price, on average, mothers’ hours of work would decrease by about 
0.11 per cent and their employment rate would decrease by 0.07 per cent.  
The net price elasticities of hours of work and employment of the mothers with 
pre-school  children are -0.096  and  -0.059, respectively. As expected, they are 
slightly smaller than the gross price elasticities due to the means-testing of CCB.  
4.2.2  Relationship to previous results 
These findings confirm those of Gong et al. (2010) that there is a negative and 
statistically significant labour supply response of partnered women to child care 
price.  The estimates reported in Table 4 and those reported by Gong et al. (2010) 
are not statistically different from one another.  However, Gong et al. (2010) 
report a higher point estimate of the gross price elasticity of employment of 
-0.29.   32 
There are five reasons why the point estimates between the two studies might 
differ.  Firstly, the two papers use a different estimation approach.  In this paper, 
we directly specify the utility function and the household budget constraint. In 
Gong, et al. (2010), a linear approximation of the labour supply function that is 
consistent with the utility maximisation process is estimated.12
Fourthly, and the biggest difference between the two papers, is the way that 
child care prices are treated in the estimation of elasticities.  One reason why one 
might expect smaller elasticities in this paper is that they are calculated with 
respect to a change in the child care price for pre-school children.  In Gong et al. 
(2010), elasticities are reported with respect to a change in average child care 
price which means that all child care prices are changing, not just those for pre-
school children.  This difference is expected to lead to smaller estimates in this 
paper than in Gong et al. (2010).  To confirm this point, we calculated gross child 
care price elasticities specific to pre-school children using the results from Gong 
et al. (2010).  The employment elasticity of the child care price of pre-school 
   Secondly, the 
two papers use different samples.  This paper uses a sample of households 
which have at least one pre-school  child whereas Gong, et al. (2010) use  all 
households with children under the age of 13.  Thirdly, the estimates reported in 
this paper are the ‘average elasticity’, which is the average of the elasticity across 
all observations. In Gong et al., the ‘elasticity of the average’ is reported, which 
is the elasticity calculated at the sample average.  While it is clear that these three 
differences should result in different elasticity estimates, we have no a priori 
beliefs about whether this should make elasticity estimates larger or smaller.  
                                              
12 Gong et al. (2010) contains a lengthy discussion of the contrast between the `direct’ approach 
of this paper and the `indirect’ approach of that paper. 33 
children is estimated to be about -0.15.  Indeed, this is smaller than the estimate 
of -0.29 for the elasticity with respect to average (all) prices. 
A fifth important difference between the two papers is that the model in this 
paper incorporates the quantity constraint on total child care hours equaling or 
exceeding mothers’ work hours while allowing formal child care hours to be less 
than the mothers' work hours. 
4.2.3  Child care demand elasticities 
As expected, child care demand is negatively impacted by its own price. From 
Table 4, the average net child care price elasticity of formal child care hours is 
-0.246; for a one per cent increase in the net child care price, child care hours 
decrease, on average, by about 0.25 per cent.  The net elasticity of formal child 
care use with respect to its own price is -0.132, which means that a one per cent 
increase in the net child care price would lead to 0.132 per cent decrease in child 
care use.  
The results in Table 4  show that  both  child care demand and labour supply 
elasticities with respect to wage are positive and they are both negative with 
respect to child care price. The two cross-price elasticities have the same sign as 
the own price elasticities (wage elasticity of labour supply and child care price 
elasticity  of child care) which  implies  that labour supply and child care are 
complements.  
As mentioned above, the assumption that child care of school-aged children 
mirrors  that of pre-school  children is quite strong.   Estimation results and 
elasticities for an alternative specification, in which child care for school-aged 
children is assumed to be fixed and does not enter the utility function, are 
presented in Tables A.1.1 through A.1.4 of  the Appendix. The simulated 34 
elasticities are quite similar to the original specification.  We conclude that this 
restriction does not matter for the substantive results. 
4.2.4  Elasticities of subsamples 
The response of both labour supply and child care demanded might differ for 
households with different characteristics.  For families where mothers’ 
participation in the labour market is more valuable (where the mother has 
higher wages) or for families which are more able to afford child care, we might 
see smaller responses to price changes.  To better understand these effects, we 
split the samples in numerous ways related to mother's wage (by education and 
directly by mother's wage), household income (father's education and household 
income other than the mother's earnings) and number of children.  We present 
elasticities for these various sample partitions in Table 5. 
Table 5. Elasticities for selected sub-samples 
With respect to  Labour supply  elasticity  Child care demand elasticity 
Hours  Employment  Hours of formal care  Use of formal care 
Gross child care price of pre-school children 
By mother’s education               
      With tertiary education 









By father’s education         
      With tertiary education 









By number of children         
      One pre-school child 









By mother’s wage         
    Above median 









By household income (other than mother's earnings)     
  Above median 









Net child care price 
By mother’s education               
      With tertiary education 









By father’s education         
      With tertiary education 









By number of children         
      One pre-school child 









By mother’s wage         
    Above median 









By household income (other than mother's earnings)     
  Above median 









Standard errors are in the parentheses. ** Significant at 5 % level. * Significant at 10% level. 
The first conclusion from Table 5 is that labour supply response clearly differs 
by demographic group.  The labour supply of women with higher wages or in 
households with higher income levels is slightly less responsive to child care 
price than those with lower wages or from households with lower income.  For 
example, the average employment elasticity of the  net child care price for 
women with wages above the median is -0.05, while for those whose wages are 
below the median, it is -0.07.13
Similar to the results for labour supply elasticities, child care demand elasticities 
are also slightly smaller for women with higher wage/education or with a more 
educated  partner  (or higher  income  from household sources other than the 
mother's earnings)  than those with lower wage/education or with lower 
educated partners (other household income).  
  Comparing women above and below median 
non-labour income, with high and low education, or with partners with high 
and low education produces similar results. This is not surprising, as education, 
wage, and household income are all strongly correlated.  Lower responsiveness 
from women with higher wages and income may be partly because child care 
costs are a smaller part of the household budget for these women. 
Child care price elasticities also differ  by family type.  In households with 
multiple children, labour supply elasticities of child care price are larger than 
those in single child households.  In multiple children households, child care 
                                              
13 We can reject that these differences are zero at the 5 per cent level using the bootstrapped 
confidence intervals.   36 
costs form a larger part of the budget and the household response to a change in 
child care price is thus larger.     37 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we construct and estimate a model of labour supply and child care 
demand for partnered women with pre-school children.  The model extends the 
standard discrete structural labour supply model by explicitly including child 
care as a separate argument of the utility function. This model enables us to 
analyse labour supply and child care demand simultaneously.  We expect this 
approach  to  correspond more closely  to how households actually make 
decisions about work and child care.  We introduce an important 
methodological innovation in this paper in that we impose a quantity constraint 
that the number of total  child care hours (formal,  informal  and paternal)  is 
required to be at least as large as the number of hours worked by the mother.  
However, unlike previous papers, we allow formal child care to exceed mother's 
work hours to account for other possible uses of child care such as child 
development.  Unobserved heterogeneity  in time allocation preferences is 
included and is  allowed to be correlated with unobservable factors which 
influence wages.  The model is estimated using Simulated Maximum Likelihood 
with data drawn from the fifth to seventh waves (covering the period 2005 - 
2007)  of the ‘in-confidence’ version of the Household, Income, and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. 
Utility function, child care demand, and wage equation estimates are used to 
simulate estimates of the gross and net child care price elasticities for partnered 
women with children.  This framework can also be used to estimate the effects 
on  labour supply, child care  demand, income distributions, and public 
expenditure of possible future policy changes.   38 
We find statistically significant gross and net child care price elasticities of 
labour supply for partnered women with young children. In particular the net 
child care price elasticities of hours of work and employment are about -0.10 and 
-0.06, respectively.    These  estimates are not statistically significantly different 
than those in Gong et al. (2010)  and  they re-confirm  that the labour supply 
behaviour of partnered women with young children does respond to the price of 
child care.  
We explore how different demographic groups may respond differently to child 
care price changes.  Labour supply and child care demand responses to child 
care price changes are highest amongst women with lower wages, lower 
household income, and lower education.  This suggests that targeted child care 
subsidies may be slightly more effective for low wage earners and/or women in 
low income households if the aim is to encourage female labour supply.  
Here we focus only on partnered mothers with pre-school children and we treat 
fathers’  work decisions as fixed.    This provides two future extensions which 
could be considered: the analysis could be extended to households with only 
school-aged children  (and without pre-school  children) and to single-parent 
households; and the behaviour of fathers in couple-headed households could be 
included in the model.   Both extensions involve additional model complexity 
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APPENDIX 
A.1  ESTIMATES OF AN ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION 
The following tables present the results of an alternative model specification 
where child care of the school-aged children is assumed to be fixed and does not 
enter the utility function explicitly. 
Table A.1.1. Simulated maximum likelihood estimates--parameters of the utility function 
Alternative specification:  child care for school-aged children is fixed and does not enter 
the household utility function 
Variables     
2
11  () yA   -0.165[-1.41] 
2
22  () lA  -1.460**[-4.52] 
2
m 33 c ( ) A   0.278**[3.01] 
12  () yl A   -0.027[-0.26] 
13  () m yc A   -0.009[-0.10] 
23  () m lc A   -0.514**[-5.03] 
1 b   5.074**[6.22] 
' bs  
 
2 b   3 b  
Constant   -0.895[-0.69]  2.910[1.53] 
Age of the mother        0.346**[2.29]  0.398**[2.90] 
The mother speaks a language other than English  -0.938**[-2.72]  -0.001[0.00] 
The mother is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander  -1.371**[-1.34]  1.355[1.25] 
The mother was educated in Australia but was not born in Australia  0.039[0.13]   
The mother was educated and born outside of Australia  0.001[0.00]   
Age of the youngest child  0.399**[5.53]  0.047[0.25] 
No. of children aged 0 to 4  0.867**[5.16]  0.346[1.50] 
No. of children aged 5 to 12  -0.212**[-2.01]  0.110[1.28] 
No. of children aged 13 to 15  0.285[1.34]  -0.650**[-2.83] 
Presence of female adult (besides mother) in household  0.140[0.31]  0.456[1.02] 
Dummy variables for highest level of education received:     
Father received higher education               -0.220[-0.79]  -0.150[-0.66] 
Father received vocational education           -0.034[-0.13]  0.028[0.14] 
Father did not finish year 12                    -0.191[-0.65]  -0.132[-0.53] 
Father has Year 12 education     
The mother and the father were both educated in Australia but neither 
was born in Australia 
  -0.020[-0.14] 
The mother and  the father were both born and educated outside of   
Australia 
  -0.459**[-2.01] 
Presence of children older than 12 in household    0.163[1.38] 
Mean age of pre-school children                     -0.176[-0.90] 
% of child care staff with teaching experience (state average)           -0.038*[-1.95] 
% of child care staff with teaching qualification (state average)       -0.009[-0.37] 
Variance of the unobserved preference for leisure (
2
2
p σ )  0.013[0.05]  0.159**[3.11] 
Covariance  of unobserved preference for leisure and unobserved 
heterogeneity in wage (
wp σ ) 
0.037[0.91]  0.147**[5.98] 
 
Table A.1.1 (continued) 43 
Simulated maximum likelihood estimates--parameters of the utility function 
Alternative specification:  child care for school-aged children is fixed and does not enter 
the household utility function 
Fixed benefit equation 
Constant    1.222**[7.26]  
Age of the mother        -0.218**[-5.22] 
The mother speaks a language other than English   0.239**[2.96]  
The mother is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander  -0.067[-0.38]   
The mother was educated in Australia but was not born in Australia   0.053[0.84]    
The mother was educated and born outside of Australia   0.154*[1.80]   
Age of the youngest child  -0.083**[-4.75] 
No. of children aged 0 to 4   0.014[0.35]    
No. of children aged 5 to 12   0.108**[3.56]  
No. of children aged 13 to 15   0.288**[3.67]  
Presence of female adult (besides mother) in household   0.004[0.04]    
Dummy variables for highest level of education received:   
Father received higher education               -0.009[-0.13] 
Father received vocational education           -0.045[-0.74] 
Father did not finish year 12                     0.079[1.10]  
Father has Year 12 education   
Dummy, wave 6 (2006)   0.027[0.72]  
Dummy, wave 7 (2007)   0.059[1.54]  
Likelihood  -3350.86 
Observations  2,023 
t-values are in the brackets. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. 44 
Table A.1.2. Simulated maximum likelihood estimates– wage equation 
Alternative specification:  child care for school-aged children is fixed and does not enter 
the household utility function 
Variables  Mothers of the pre-school children 
Constant    1.992**[7.52]   
Age of the mother         0.477**[3.02]   
Age-squared  of the mother        -0.049**[-2.08]  
Dummy variables for highest level of education received:   
Mother received higher education                0.449**[15.01]  
Mother received vocational education            0.121**[3.92]   
Mother did not finish year 12                    -0.089**[-2.51]  
Mother has Year 12 education   
The mother speaks a language other than English  -0.097**[-2.46]  
The mother is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander  -0.014[-0.10]    
The mother was not with both parents at the age of 14  -0.027[-1.00]    
Sydney   
Balance of NSW  -0.138**[-3.69]  
Melbourne               -0.139**[-4.34]  
Balance of VIC    -0.114**[-2.67]  
Brisbane          -0.125**[-3.34]  
Balance of QLD    -0.123**[-3.21]  
Adelaide           -0.049[-0.91]    
Balance of SA     -0.256**[-2.91]  
Perth             -0.172**[-3.50]  
Balance of WA    -0.207**[-3.45]  
Tasmania              -0.223**[-2.31]  
Northern Territory  -0.094[-0.50]    
ACT              -0.068[-1.30]    
The mother was educated in Australia but was not born in Australia  -0.039[-1.28]    
The mother was educated and born outside of Australia  -0.147**[-3.04]  
Variance of the unobservables in the wage equation (
2
w σ )  0.151**[63.66] 
t-values are in the brackets. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. 
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Table A.1.3. Elasticities:  partnered mothers with at least one pre-school child 
Alternative specification:  child care for school-aged children is fixed and does not enter 
the household utility function 
With respect to  Labour supply elasticity  Child care demand elasticity 
Hours  employment  Hours of formal care  Use of formal care 
Gross child care price  -0.105** (0.03)  -0.069** (0.02)  -0.282** (0.05)  -0.160** (0.03) 
Net child care price  -0.079** (0.02)  -0.052** (0.01)  -0.221** (0.04)  -0.126** (0.02) 
Wage  0.417** (0.09)  0.268** (0.05)  0.275** (0.06)  0.172** (0.04) 
Household  Income  (other 
than mother's earnings) 
-0.087 (0.05)  -0.045 (0.04)  -0.038 (0.04)  -0.032 (0.02) 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. ** Significant at 5 % level. * Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Table A.1.4. Elasticities for selected sub-samples  
Alternative specification:  child care for school-aged children is fixed and does not enter 
the household utility function 
With respect to  Labour supply  elasticity  Child care demand elasticity 
Hours  employment  Hours of formal care  Use of formal care 
Gross child care price of pre-school children 
By mother’s education               
      With tertiary education 









By father’s education         
      With tertiary education 









By number of children         
      One pre-school child 









By mother’s wage         
    Above median 









By household income (other than mother's earnings)     
  Above median 









Net child care price 
By mother’s education               
      With tertiary education 









By father’s education         
      With tertiary education 









By number of children         
      One pre-school child 









By mother’s wage         
    Above median 









By household income (other than mother's earnings)     
  Above median 









Standard errors are in the parentheses. ** Significant at 5 % level. * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table A.1.4 (continued) Elasticities for selected sub-samples  
Alternative specification:  child care for school-aged children is fixed and does not enter 
the household utility function 
With respect to  Labour supply  elasticity  Child care demand elasticity 
Hours  employment  Hours of formal care  Use of formal care 
Wage 
By mother’s education               
      With tertiary education 









By father’s education         
      With tertiary education 







0.168** (0.03)  
0.183**(0.04) 
By number of children         
      One pre-school child 









By mother’s wage         
    Above median 









By household income (other than mother's earnings)     
  Above median 










By mother’s education               
      With tertiary education 
      Without tertiary education 
-0.113** (0.06) 
-0.051 (0.04) 






By father’s education         
      With tertiary education 









By number of children         
      One pre-school child 









By mother’s wage         
    Above median 









By household income (other than mother's earnings)     
  Above median 









Standard errors are in the parentheses. ** Significant at 5 % level. * Significant at 10% level. 
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A.2  ESTIMATES USING THE SUB-SAMPLE OF MOTHERS WITH PRE-
SCHOOL CHILDREN ONLY 
The following tables present the results using the sub-sample of mothers who 
only have pre-school children and no school-aged children.   
Table A.2.1. Simulated maximum likelihood estimates--parameters of the utility function 
Alternative sample:  Partnered mothers with at least one pre-school child and no 
school-aged children, pooled estimates (2005-2007) 
Variables     
2
11  () yA   -0.278**[-2.40] 
2
22  () lA  -1.714**[-3.91] 
2
m 33 c ( ) A    0.069[0.54]    
12  () yl A   -0.066[-0.45]   
13  () m yc A   -0.120[-1.09]   
23  () m lc A   -0.525**[-3.81] 
1 b    6.186**[8.38]  
' bs   2 b   3 b  
Constant   -0.761[-0.41]  4.995**[2.02] 
Age of the mother        0.412**[2.03]  0.283*[1.70] 
The mother speaks a language other than English  -0.814*[-1.75]  -0.064[-0.20] 
The mother is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander  -0.895[-0.87]  2.854**[2.43] 
The mother was educated in Australia but was not born in Australia  0.113[0.29]   
The mother was educated and born outside of Australia  0.055[0.10]   
Age of the youngest child  0.451**[4.07]  0.068[0.29] 
No. of children aged 0 to 4  0.837**[3.67]  0.399[1.47] 
No. of children aged 5 to 12     
No. of children aged 13 to 15  -0.213[-0.57]  -0.314[-0.86] 
Presence of female adult (besides mother) in household  0.830[1.16]  0.724[1.25] 
Dummy variables for highest level of education received:     
Father received higher education               -0.306[-0.77]  -0.132[-0.53] 
Father received vocational education           -0.090[-0.26]  -0.128[-0.45] 
Father did not finish year 12                    -0.011[-0.03]  -0.128[-0.48] 
Father has Year 12 education     
The mother and the father were both educated in Australia but neither 
was born in Australia 
  0.061[0.32] 
The mother and  the father were both born and educated outside of   
Australia 
  -0.686**[-2.42] 
Presence of children older than 12 in household    0.015[0.10] 
Mean age of pre-school children                     -0.279[-1.15] 
% of child care staff with teaching experience (state average)           -0.042*[-1.64] 
% of child care staff with teaching qualification (state average)       -0.007[-0.25] 
Variance of the unobserved preference for leisure (
2
2
p σ )  0.012[0.06]  0.118**[2.03] 
Covariance  of unobserved preference for leisure and unobserved 
heterogeneity in wage (
wp σ ) 
0.041[0.63]  0.132**[4.05] 
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Table A.2.1 (continued) 
Simulated maximum likelihood estimates--parameters of the utility function 
Alternative sample:  Partnered mothers with at least one pre-school child and no 
school-aged children, pooled estimates (2005-2007) 
Fixed benefit equation 
Constant    1.424**[5.55]  
Age of the mother        -0.266**[-4.10] 
The mother speaks a language other than English   0.193[1.46]  
The mother is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander  -0.477**[-2.20]   
The mother was educated in Australia but was not born in Australia   0.104[1.08]    
The mother was educated and born outside of Australia   0.279**[2.17]   
Age of the youngest child  -0.084**[-3.06] 
No. of children aged 0 to 4   0.021[0.37]    
No. of children aged 5 to 12    
No. of children aged 13 to 15   0.404**[2.63]  
Presence of female adult (besides mother) in household   -0.242[1.53]    
Dummy variables for highest level of education received:   
Father received higher education               0.025[-0.25] 
Father received vocational education           -0.058[-0.65] 
Father did not finish year 12                     0.157[1.42]  
Dummy, wave 6 (2006)   0.030[0.51]  
Dummy, wave 7 (2007)   0.051[0.86]  
Likelihood  -1,979.49 
Observations  1,159 
t-values are in the brackets. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. 
 
 
Table A.2.2. Simulated maximum likelihood estimates– wage equation 
 Alternative sample:  Partnered mothers with at least one pre-school child and no 
school-aged children, pooled estimates (2005-2007) 
Variables  Mothers of the pre-school children 
Constant    2.405**[6.19]   
Age of the mother         0.186[0.79]   
Age-squared  of the mother        0.002[0.06] 
Dummy variables for highest level of education received:   
Mother received higher education                0.429**[10.67]  
Mother received vocational education            0.155**[3.68]   
Mother did not finish year 12                    -0.088[-1.58]  
Mother has Year 12 education   
The mother speaks a language other than English  -0.093[-1.61]  
The mother is Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander  -0.084[-0.46]    
The mother was not with both parents at the age of 14  -0.103**[-2.38]    
Sydney   
Balance of NSW  -0.052[-0.98]  
Melbourne               -0.123**[-2.66]  
Balance of VIC    -0.059[-0.98]  
Brisbane          -0.093*[-1.79]  
Balance of QLD    -0.147**[-2.53]  
Adelaide           -0.142**[-2.06]    
Balance of SA     -0.144[-1.21]  
Perth             -0.198**[-2.58]  
Balance of WA    -0.361**[-2.88]  
Tasmania              -0.162[-0.88]  
Northern Territory  -0.167[-0.76]    
ACT              -0.151**[-2.11]    
The mother was educated in Australia but was not born in Australia  0.023[0.54]    
The mother was educated and born outside of Australia  -0.009[-0.15]  
Variance of the unobservables in the wage equation ( 2
w σ )  0.150**[45.85] 
t-values are in the brackets. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. 
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Table A.2.3. Elasticities Alternative sample:  Partnered mothers with at least one pre-
school child and no school-aged children, pooled estimates (2005-2007) 
With respect to  Labour supply elasticity  Child care demand elasticity 
Hours  employment  Hours of formal care  Use of formal care 
Gross child care price  -0.107** (0.03)  -0.072** (0.02)  -0.284** (0.07)  -0.159** (0.03) 
Net child care price  -0.081** (0.03)  -0.054** (0.02)  -0.223** (0.03)  -0.126** (0.02) 
Wage  0.432** (0.11)  0.278** (0.07)  0.304** (0.06)  0.189** (0.04) 
Household Income  (other 
than mother's earnings) 
-0.029 (0.05)  0.002 (0.03)  -0.012 (0.04)  0.001 (0.03) 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. ** Significant at 5 % level. * Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table A.2.4. Elasticities for selected sub-samples  
Alternative sample:  Partnered mothers with at least one pre-school child and no 
school-aged children, pooled estimates (2005-2007) 
With respect to  Labour supply  elasticity  Child care demand elasticity 
Hours  employment  Hours of formal care  Use of formal care 
Gross child care price of pre-school children 
By mother’s education               
      With tertiary education 









By father’s education         
      With tertiary education 









By number of children         
      One pre-school child 









By mother’s wage         
    Above median 









By household income (other than 
mother's earnings) 
       
  Above median 









Net child care price 
By mother’s education               
      With tertiary education 









By father’s education         
      With tertiary education 









By number of children         
      One pre-school child 









By mother’s wage         
    Above median 









By household income (other than 
mother's earnings) 
       
  Above median 









Standard errors are in the parentheses. ** Significant at 5 % level. * Significant at 10% level. 
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Table A.2.4. Elasticities for selected sub-samples  
Alternative sample:  Partnered mothers with at least one pre-school child and no 
school-aged children, pooled estimates (2005-2007) 
With respect to  Labour supply  elasticity  Child care demand elasticity 
Hours  employment  Hours of formal care  Use of formal care 
Wage 
By mother’s education               
      With tertiary education 









By father’s education         
      With tertiary education 









By number of children         
      One pre-school child 









By mother’s wage         
    Above median 









By household income (other than 
mother's earnings) 
       
  Above median 










By mother’s education               
      With tertiary education 
      Without tertiary education 
-0.051 (0.05) 
0.013 (0.04) 






By father’s education         
      With tertiary education 









By number of children         
      One pre-school child 









By mother’s wage         
    Above median 









By household income (other than 
mother's earnings) 
       
  Above median 









Standard errors are in the parentheses. ** Significant at 5 % level. * Significant at 10% level. 
 